Adrija Guhathakurta
National Law University, Odisha
Introduction:
Sedition Laws in India have been a matter of debate under various circumstances. This article discusses the comparison of the execution and importance of the laws pre and post constitutional era. Like many other policies and acts, sedition laws have also undergone a fair amount of modifications and the recent consultation paper, by the Indian law Commission, on sedition laws has also put forth a thorough demarcation of the same. The report has also raised several questions that are required to be addressed by the authorities and students of the country alike. A democratic country is having its base in the very foundation of freedom of speech and expression. Sedition Laws governing the same form an important tangent of a government following a democratic political structure.
A deviation from the path of the true essence of democracy has always been found to be stemming from the suppression of the voices of citizens. In today’s day and age, with the growing usage of the web, the privacy of an individual is already at stake. When we bring sedition laws into the scenario, we must lookout for the possible implications of the same in the modern scenario. Before constitution was made, our country formed an integral part of the age of colonization. Post the establishment of Constitution, the usage of the laws has been through many alterations. In the age of technology, however, we need to see whether the alterations are enough to hold the framework of a working democracy in place.
Pre-Constitutional Era:
The law of Sedition was introduced in 1870 in India as a result of increasing Wahhabi operations between 1863 and 1870; the law was amended in 1898 and was imported from various sources according to Arvind Ganachari–the Treason Felony act, the Common Law of seditious libel, and English law regarding seditious words. This law was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1870. The British attempted, between 1870 and 1898, to suppress criticism in two legislation; the 1876 Dramatic Act, which introduced the theater’s pre-censorship, and the 1878 Vernacular Press Act which provided for the control, by the new security system, of publishers and printers of the Native Press.
Originally section 113 of Macaulay’s Draft Penal Code of 1837-39 was the section corresponding to section 124A, but the section was omitted from the Indian Penal Code as enacted in 1860. In the context of the First War of Indian Independence in 1857, that was an extraordinary decision. In 1870, Section 124-A was added to the Code and was not in its present form at that time. This section was further amended in 1891 and accompanied by explanations. The term ‘ disaffection’ then was discussed in several instances between 1870 and 1898. In the case of Queen v. Jogendra Chandra Bose, C.J. Pretham gave the first judicial interpretation of Section 124A. Petheram explained’ disaffection’ as an anti-affection feeling, i.e. disgust or hatred. Disapproval merely implies disagreement.
The case of Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak led to the rejection of the interpretation that only acts that would incite violence against the government would be seditious in nature. This was the judgement that led to the amendment of 1989 where it was added that the term ‘disaffection’ would include ‘disloyalty’ and ‘feelings of enmity’.
In the case of Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. the King Emperor, it was held that an act would be considered seditious only if it disrupts public order or attempts to do so. However, the judgement was over-ruled in the case of King-Emperor v. Sadasiv Narayan Bhalerao.
The most significant case that challenged the constitutional validity of section 124 IPC, post-constitution period, was the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar. The Court drew a line between the terms, ‘the Government established by law’ and ‘the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration’. After this case, disruption of public order became a necessary ingredient of the Sedition law. With regards to Raghubir Singh v. Bihar State, the Supreme Court ruled that it was not essential that the accused personally would have written the seditious content or effectively tried to incite hatred, disdain or disaffection to constitute a crime of conspire and sedition. The petitioner, who was in charge under section 124A IPC, approached Delhi HC for bail in the event of Kanhaiya Kumar v. State (Delhi NCT). The court held that the freedom of speech and expression defined under article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution and Part IV and Art51A that defined fundamental duties are basically the two sides of the same coin.
These cases, as mentioned by the report, justified the fact that only those acts disrupting public serenity would be considered seditious in nature.
But some of the recent incidents that say otherwise are:
1. The one concerning Aseem Trivedi, cartoonist, 2011. In Mumbai, he was detained under IPC Sections 124 (sedition), Section 66A of the IT Act and Section 2 of the Nation Honour Act.
2. The state of Chhattisgarh accused Dr. Binayak Sen of sedition in 2011. Dr. Binayak Sen is an Indian paediatrician, a specialist in public health as well as an activist and is the Vice-President of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties. He was accused of being a messenger for Maoists.
3. Arundhati Roy, Syed Ali, leader of Hurriyat, and others, for their 2010 seminar where they were accused of putting forth an “anti-India” speech on behalf of independence in the contested region of Kashmir, hence, were arrested under the charge of sedition and were booked by Delhi police.
4. The Rajasthan government accused Praveen Togadia of sedition in 2003. The charges include an attempt “to fight the country.”
5. The latest case was against Kanhaiya Kumar, President of JNUSU, charged with speaking against the execution of Afzal guru and was declared an anti-Indian by police in Delhi under this Law. A public outcry was caused, by Kumar’s arrest, on free expression, efforts were made to shut down the state, dissent was brought against the policies of the government, the role of the press in public debate began to gain a stance of considerable importance, marginalized communities’ rights and safety forces’ violations of human rights along with vigilante politics and even the death penalty now are framed as considerable problems that should be discussed and dealt with.
Conclusion:
Many voices against such arbitrary constraints of fundamental right to free speech and expression as provided by India’s constitution have been raised by indiscriminate use of archaic law for dissidents against the state. Given the governing group in the last four years, there is only increasing intolerance to criticism, with governments tightening up on freedom of expression, behind the regalia of disloyalty and anti-national feelings.
As can be seen, the ambit of right to offend seems to have been interpreted as rather narrow though in a democratic country, like ours, liberty should define the lives of the citizens. The current usage of the law is like its usage in the colonial rule. Through the various cases and developments post constitution, the implementation of the Sedition law hasn’t been in its right essence. The true interpretation of the law remains a mystery.
